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Feminist geography and political geography still represent two solitudes within the discipline. While increased
raffic between tlrese different parts of the discipline poins to a degree of intellectual engagement, there remains
a paucity of feminist thought in political geography. This article examines recent scholarship on feminist
political geography, with a view to applying its insights to the struggles to protest and end political violence. The
concept of feminist geopolitics is employed and recast, both as a bridging concept between feminist and political
geography and as an analytical approach that has political valence in the context of the war in Iraq. Feminist
geopolitics is revisited in this article, but remains a critical analytic in relation to body counts and other casualties
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An average of nearly 100 Iraqi civilians were
killed every d^y in May andJune [2006].
-(cBC 2006)
-fhis article has two discrete but closely re-
I lated objectives. On the one hand, I address
the question of what feminist theory and femi-
nist geography, in particular, bring to political
geography, arguing that th.y contribute a dis-
tinct approach to the production of geograph-
ical knowledge. On the other, I aim to sharpen
and deepen one dimension of feminist political
geography by revisiting a piece of my own work
on feminist geopolitics and body counts in war
zones. Drawing on the scholarship of feminists
both within and beyond the discipline, I con-
tend that feminist thought challenges existing
conceptions of "the politi cal" in political geog-
raphy; and that feminist subjects "embody,
enact and expose" paradoxes (Joan Scott in
Pratt 2002, 198) that eschew disembodied,
free-floating epistemologies. Together, these
feminist contributions generate grounds for
alternative modes of knowledge production
in geography that are at once feminist and
political.
In part one of this article, I explore some of
the most salient contributions of feminist think-
irg and feminist geography in particular to pol-
itical geography. My focus is geopolitics and
specifically the "war on terror" in Afghanistan
and Iraq, but includes a brief analysis of recent
scholarship that traverses the divide benveen
political geography and feminist geography.
The traffic benveen these different parts of the
discipline points to (r) increasing 'intellecnral
engagement, but (b) r notable lack of feminist
geography on the radar of mainstream political
geographers. The authors of one undergraduate
textbook in political geography assess the rele-
vance of feminist geography to political geo-
graphy this way:
two relatively new themes have become promin-
ent in publications devoted to or identified as
political geography. One is an attempt ro relate
geography to changes in social theory. Much of
this is a continuation of one or another of the
many efforts to apply Manrist theory to geog-
raphy, though with different emphases and inter-
pretations. The other is the inuoduction of
"gender issues" or "feminist viewpoints" into
the continuing evolution of our field. h remains to
be seen wbetber eitber of these trends has enoagh sub-
stance and staying pouer to su,ntiae the ineuitable as-
saults of reality on tbem. Some of the ideas may
survive in other disciplines such as sociology or
political theory but only those based on both
politics and geography are likely to be inco{por-
ated into future mainstream political geography.
-(Glassner and Fahrer 2004,8-9; emphasis
added)
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Apparently, the case for feminist thought (as
well as Manrist theory) in political geography
has yet to be made in some academic circles. I
intend to fill this gap in a partial way in the
remainder of the article.
In part two, I revisit an argument that I made
about "feminist geopolitics" and the uneven
practices of body counts in Afghrnistan in2001
(Hyodman 2003). Written after 11 September
2001 (rereafter "9/ 1 1") but before the invasion
of Iraq in March 2003, f countenanced a liberal
argument that underscored the universal value
of human life (and death) because I saw it as
politic ally persuasive to the citizenry and gov-
ernment of a superpower state whose mantra is
one of transformirg so-called rogue states (see
Sidaway 2003) into democratic ones.r I posited
that U.S. citizens would find the death toll of
Afghan civilians killed in order to roust the
Thliban, t number similar to that of Americans
killed during glLI, unacceptable. Tactically, I
profFered that "their" deaths would count to
Americans as much as American deaths, if
someone were in fact counting Afghan civilian
casualties. I fully realized the theoretical cri-
tiques and shortcomings of this liberal argu-
ment and its problematic assumption that all life
is valued equally, but wanted to highlight the
[liberal] failure of the U.S. military as an occu-
ptrng force to take on its fiiberal] legal respon-
sibiliry as outlined in the Geneva Conventions,
to record these fatalities. As WendyLarner and
Richa Nagar in different contexts have asked of
their feminist research, "what kinds of struggles
does my analysis make possible for them [r.-
search participants]?" (Larner L995; Nagar
2002). I attempted to make possible the strug-
gle for greater Lf.S. accountability in relation to
civilian deaths. Counting bodies in Afghanistan
has had some effect; the U.S. Congress was
persuaded to pass a US$l7.5 million compen-
sation package for victims of the war in Af-
ghanistan and Irae, but the U.S. military
presence and violence in Iraq have only escal-
ated since M^y2A$ when President Bush stood
before a banner that declared "mission accom-
plished." Are body counts politically persua-
sive? And if not, why not?
In exploring the politics of body counts, I re-
visit the concept of feminist geopolitics as an
analytical framing of militafized violence and
death in Iraq. In an earlier paper, I argued that
feminist geopolitics is an approach to interna-
tional relations that provides more accountable,
embodied ways of seeing and understanding the
intersection of povrer and space (Hy"dman
2003). I made the case then and still contend
that it refers to an analytic that is contingenr on
context, place, and time, rather than a new the-
ory of geopolitics or a new ordering of space.
Feminist geopolitical analyses are more ac-
countable to the safety of bodies, traversing
scales from the macrosecurity of states to the
microsecurity of people and their homes; from
the disembodied space of neorealist geopolitics
to a field of live human subjects with names,
families, and hometowns. The argument that
counting civilian deaths "over there" as a strat-
eW to protest and stop the deadly military ap-
proach employed in Afghanistan has proven,
however, politically ineffecnral. The mountirg
deaths of U.S. soldiers "over fus1s"-now more
than 2,500_'is a more pressing concern for the
LJ.S. government, afFecting domestic support
for the \Mar in Iraq. In taking feminist geopolitics
to Iraq, where tens ofthousands of civilians have
perished, I revisit my analysis with a view to
ieframirg my argument and the struggles
against violence there. I question whether
counting bodies has not become a disembod-
ied, abstract process, the methodology ofwhich
has been as contentious as the deaths themselves.
I argue that feminist geopolitics offers more epi-
stemologically embodied accounts of war that
more effectively convey the loss and sufFering of
people affected by it. Specifically, feminisr geo-
politics challenges the state centrism of global
politics, the disembodied epistemology ofknow-
ledge production, and the masculinist practices
of militarizing states. In so doing, feminisr geo-
politics destabilizes dominant and often disem-
bodied geopolitical discourse. People as much as
states are the subjects of geopolitics. Bringing
feminist thought to political geography generally
and the war in Iraq specifically deepens analysis
that links the two.
Two Solitudes: Feminist and Political
Geography
Despite important feminist forays into political
geography (Kofrnan and Peake 1990; Staeheli
L999), feminist interventions have been rela-
tively rare. Staeheli observes that feminist ge-
ographers have generally not been identified
as political geographers, raising the question as
to whether these domains of geography are
mutually exclusive. Is there evidence that the
boundaries of geography's subdisciplines are
being policed in exclusionary ways? Or have
these geographical rpproaches and projects
simply been separate undertakings with little
overlap within geography? These and other
questions areaddressed in a landmark collection
of geographic scholarship recently published to
fill the gap benn'een feminist and political geog-
raphy (Staeheli, Kofrnan, and Peake 2004).
Jenkins,Jones, and Dixon (2003, 58) pondera
related questior, asking whether there is "a dis-
tinct critical edge to feminist research" in geog-
raphy. That is to say, is feminist geography the
same as or difFerent from critical approaches in
geography generally and in political geography
specifically? Feminists, queer theorists, and
scholars of racism have demonstrated that the
political cannot be contained by r class-based
analysis: the personal, the sexual, the cultural
and the co{poreal are all political too (Sparke
2004). Nor is the political solely the domain of
states, their relations of power to one another,
their institutions, and relations to their citizens.
Feminists have long argued that the personal is
the political, while eschewing the privati zatron
of such politics in the domestic sphere. The
political is constitutive (Martin 2004); that is, it
"implies an approach to the political as an on-
going process in which societies are made-
constinrted-in and through struggle " (Staeheli
and Koftnan2004, 3). Feminists both inside and
outside of geography have also been advocates
of reconceptu alizingwhat constitutes the big 'P'
political, the ptop.i subjects of political geog-
raphy. Much "contemporary political geog-
raphy describes a 'world without people' or at
least a world of abstract, disembodied political
subjects. . . . The ways in which knowledge is
produced within political geography constifirte
a masculinist practice. It yields a kind of know-
ledge that is claimed to be universal (or at least
all-encompassing) and impartial" (Staeheli and
Kofrnan2004,5).
Critical geopolitics, a camp within political
geography, has undertaken the challenge of
questioning, deconstructing, and exposing
dominant political scripts +at make such uni-
versal claims (Dalby 1994; O Tuathail 2000). It
questions assumptions in a taken-for-granted
world and examines the institutional modes of
producing such a world vis-)-vis writing about
its geography and politics (Dalby 1 991). If crit-
ical geopolitics undermines the universality of
knowled ge claims from the realist/international
relations traditions within geopolitics, then the
question remains whether feminist geography,
or feminist geopolitics specifically, contribures
somethirg distinctive.
It does. Like scholars of critical geopolitics,
feminist geographers have illustrated that the
"global visions and grand theori zing" of polit-
ical geography in the main have meant that the
politics of the everyday is elided (Sharp 2004,
94). Critical geopolitics, however, has been
charged with being disembodied and free-float-
itg in its own problematic ways (Sharp 2000).
While arguing against positions that are un-
marked, unmediated, and transcendent, critical
geopolitical writing can unwittingly become
part of this categoqf (Sparke 2000). Embodied
vision, that is to say ontologically committed
partial perspectives, ffiay have the potential to
subvert dominant geopolitical narratives, ac-
tions that might have concrete effects on the
lives of people who are players in such events
(Hy"dman 2004). fu Dalby (2003 , 4) cautions,
"recent debates under the rubric of critical ge-
opolitics are always in danger of becoming dis-
cussions of social science method rather than
engagements with politics, discussions of the
relative merits of various theorists rather than
critiques of the geopolitical reasonirg in vogue
in world politics." While reclaiming method as
a k y part of claims to knowledge, feminist
thinking in political geography aims to rectify
disembodied knowledge production and pro-
mote epistemologically embodied ways of
knowing.
fu Richa Na gar (2002,I82)notes, "reflexiviry
in US academic writing has mainly focused on
examining the identities of the individual re-
searcher rather than on the ways in which those
identities intersect with institutional, geopolit-
ical and material aspects of their positionaliry."
Such an individualistic approach is problematic
because it fails to sort the differences among
ethical, ontological, and material aspecrs of
positionality. Dominant modes of representing
the \Mar in Iraq in North Ameri ca are shaped by
broader processes linked to colonialism (and
therefore Orientalism), oil production, and
other political processes that operare at mul-
tiple scales.2
In what follows I employ feminist reflexivity
that approximates a critique of my own analysis
of body counts (Hy"dman 2003). In that first
article, I employed the concept of feminist geo-
politics to argue that only by counting the
deaths of innocent civilians on both sides of
violence (Afghans as well as Americans) and
protestirg all of these deaths will such killing be
stopped. In the context of lraq, I revisit this
position. f recognize that the value of counting
bodies in this war is not stable over time or
across space, but the common practices of re-
porting casualties have become so normalized
that they at once obscure and reproduce the
workings of geopolitical power that frame these
numbers. The identities of and relationships to
reported deaths and images of injured civilians
have everythirg to do with the way we respond
to the war or crisis at hand (Massey 2004). I
advocate more relational ways of representing
Iraqi casualties, by linking Iraqis to North
Americans in ways that go beyond merely
counting deaths and injuries. Counting bodies
is important, but it does not accnu,nt for the re-
markable destruction of lives and livelihoods
occurring in Iraq today.
The Two Wars: From Afghanistan to
lraq
A number is important not only to quanti$r the
cost of waE but as a reminder of those whose
dreams will never be realizedin a free and dem-
ocratic lraq.
-(Ruzicka 2005)
The dead of Iraq-as th.y have from the begin-
ning of our illegal invasion-\Mere simplywritten
out of the script. Officially they do not exist.
-(Fisk 200s)
The "fataliry metrics" of war, the body counts of
soldiers and civilians killed in violent conflict,
represent a geopolitics of war in themselves.
The quotations above capture, in the first case,
the effiorts of an American activist who tried to
insert the body count into the geopolitical script
of a "free and democratic Iraq," and in the sec-
ond, the observations of a British journalist
critical of the invasion of Iraq, lamenting the
invisible, mounting deaths of Iraqis that peaked
inJuly 2005. The deaths of militadzed soldiers
are officially counted, described, and remem-
bered by the armies that send them in to fight
and the families they leave behind; the deaths of
civilians are not. Casualties might be thought of
as masculinized (soldier) and feminized (civil-
ian) sides of the body count ledger amassed by
both official and unofficial sources. Nthough
counting is an important device for remember-
ing, it also flawed in the way it transforms un-
named dead people into abstract figures that
obfuscate the political meanings of the violence
and its social and political consequences.
Counting bodies does not sufficiendy ac-
count for the remarkable destruction of lives
and livelihoods occurring in Iraq. No metric or
measure of trauma and violence should domin-
ate the meanings of suffering and loss. Global
media do provide us with ovennrhelming infor-
mation about the scope and number ofatrocities
occurring across the world, making their mean-
irg and scope difficult to grasp. "There is too
much to see, and there appears to be too much to
do anything about. Thus, our epoch's dominat-
irg sense that complex problems can be neither
understood nor fixed works with the massive
globalizafron of images of suffering to produce
moral fatigue, exhaustion or empathy, and pol-
itical despair" (I{einman and Kleinman 1997,
9). Nonetheless, what we see or read is partial in
two senses: it is a selective and always incom-
plete representation of the crisis at hand, and it
has been fashioned in particular ways that are at
once institutionalized and convey dominant
kinds of mearirg (Shapiro 1997). "Vision is al-
ways a question of the power to see-and per-
haps of the violence implicit in our visualizing
practices,"so "anoptics is a politics of position"
(Haraway 1991, 192, 193). These partial repre-
sentations shape our responses, or not, to the
geopolitics of war and the suffering at hand.
"Much of routinized misery is invisible; much
that is made visible is not ordinary or routine"
(Kleinman, Das, and Lock L997, xiii). How vio-
lent conflict and death is represented in the
context of war is at least as important as how
much destruction and death wreaks havoc on a
society.
The more difficult question is how to pro-
duce resp onsible relational representations ofwar
that convey meanings of loss, pain, and destruc-
tion without further fuelling conflict. FIow does
one represent the futility and tragedy of civilian
death without promoting vengeance? More im-
portant, which impressions and understandings
of war acnrally shape public opinion and
government actions, so that struggles to end
such violence may be successful? In revisiting
feminist geopolitics in relation to body counts, I
argue for analyses that contexnnlize the effects
ofviolence by connecting the lives and deaths of
victims counted during war to those of the audi-
ence that consumes that information. Account-
abiliry I contend now as then, is predicated on
embodied epistemologies and visibiliq, but fa-
tality metrics fail to embody the casualties of
war. Feminist geopolitics is about putting to-
gether the quiet, even silenced, narratives of
violence and loss that do the work of taking
apaft dominant geopolitical scripts of "us" and
"them." Nthough the deconstruction of such
scripts is vital, feminist geopolitics aims to re-
cover stories and voices that potentially recast
the terrns of war on new ground.
In my earlier work on body counts during the
"war on terror" in Afghanista& I argued that the
visibiliry, or lack thereof, of civilian deaths con-
tributes to a gendered geopolitics that values
(masculinized) U.S. lives over ( feminized) Af-
ghan ones. I illustrated hoq after g/LI, short
biographies of hundreds of the people killed in
the World Trade Center and elsewhere ap-
peared inTlte New York Times. The human face
of these horrific acts of violence in the United
States was everywhere apparent. A long time
passed, however, before the same paper began to
publish photos of civilians who had lost family
members to the bombings in Afghanistan, and
to cover controversial statistics about how many
civilians had been killed in that country by Lf.S.
military planes equipped with smart and not-so-
smart bombs. Silence around the equally pre-
posterous deaths of a people already ravaged by
war and starvation was, I argued, (g.o)politic-
ally problematic. Public silence about the death
or suffering of innocents in war is a form of
political appropriation. The death ledgers, if
one can call them that, were highly gendered
lists of us and them, named and not, Americans
and Afghans, soldiers and civilians. The traged-
ies at both of ends of this violence were very
similar in terms of lives lost, but the patriotic
values placed on them and their geopolitical
value were highly disparate.
One obvious critique ofthis position is that all
lives are not equally valued, ?s the liberal cov-
enant would suggest. By forging this chain of
equivalence I was arguing for an accountability
to the very logic and principles that authori zed
military force inAfghanistan, namely that of the
United Nations Charter and its Security Coun-
cil resolution. Another critique of liberal logic is
that it often authorizes violence in the name of
national interests that are part and parcel of lib-
eral moderniq.As Thlal fuad (L997 ,285) points
out, "the modern dedication to eliminating pain
and sufflering often conflicts with the other
commitments and values: the right of individ-
uals to choose and the dnty of the state to main-
tain its interests." Nonetheless, body counts of
the invisible, feminized otheq namely Afghan
civilians, bring some visibility to the loss and
suffering in the context of American civilian
deaths and an awareness of the damage that that
war on terror has wreaked. I do not, however,
subscribe to the idea that subjecrive, specific
experiences of death can be objectively com-
pared. A utilitarian calculus of death and loss is
precisely what I aim to undermine as the dom-
inant geopolitical discourse.
In the context of Iraq and recent debates
about the legitimaqt of various civilian body
counts, the numerical calibration of loss and
suffering is making us $trorth Americans con-
suming the war through the media) more, rather
than less, complicit in the war. Counting prac-
tices have even been used to support the inva-
sion of lraq: Saddam Hussein killed some
280,000 Iraqis during his rule, so the loss of a
portion of that number is justified in the eyes of
those comparing death tallies in a realist frame-
work (Fluman Rights Watch cited in The Econ-
omist 200+D.3 The public is told that the death
of some lraqis, whether military personnel
trained by the occupying forces, or civilians, is
inevitable, a military necessiq, collateral dam-
a1e, or the price to be paid for freedom and
dernocracy. Why do newspaper readers and
television watchers know the officially docu-
mented names and exact number of U.S. and
coalition soldiers that have been killed, but not
the number of Iraqis-civilians, armed forces,
and insurgents-who have died?
The antiwar argument and its attendant lib-
eral politics are implicit in work of Iraq Body
Count (2006; hereafter IBC), a nonprofit ini-
tiative to verift reported deaths in Iraq due to
the violence of the occupation and to keep a
record of Iraqi deaths. IBC relies on secondary
sources from reputable media who use mortuary
stats, health ministry numbers, and police
reports; it is run by nventy volunteers from the
United States and Britain. The site cites Gen-
eral Tommy Franks of the Lf.S. Central Com-
mand who says, "Wedon't do bodycounts," and
so IBC does. It asks visitors to add webcounters
to their personal computers so that they too can
count the daily deaths in Iraq. The IBC site
points out that in "the current occupation phase
this database includes all deaths which the Oc-
cupying Authority has a bindi^g responsibility
to prevent under the Geneva Conventions and
Hague Regulations. This includes civilian
deaths resulting from the breakdown in law
and order, and deaths due to inadequate health
care or sanitation" (IBC 2006).+
IBC maintains that "Civilian casualties are
the most unacceptable consequence of all wars.
Each civilian death is a tragedy and should never
be regarded as the 'cost' of achieving our coun-
tries' war aims, because it is not we who ate
palrng this price" (IBC 20A6).5 Like the liberal
logic of inten/ention in Afghanistan, IBC enlists
international law and a IIN approach to human
security to justift its actions. It openly states that
its audience is the American and British publics
and governments (BBC 2005).
Methods of counting bodies have never
meant so much. I digress briefly to discuss the
recent spat about how body counts have been
conducted in Iraq. Mortality statistics, methods,
and academic activism were widely covered in
the media when with the British medical jour-
nal, Tbe Lancet, published a pre-U.S.-election
snrdy that suggested the number of Iraqis who
have died since the tf.S. invasion is likely about
98,000, with more than 60,000 directly attrib-
utable to violence in Iraq (Roberts et al. 2004;
Tbe Economist2004a).6 The study found that the
relative risk of death from any cause was 2.5
times higher for Iraqi civilians after the 2003
invasion than in the precedirg fifteen months, 2
risk that drops to 1.5 times higher if data from
the city of Fallujah are removed. These figures
are exponentially greater than reports by the
IBC and others.
The release of this paper on29 October 2004,
earlier than the journal's normal publication
date, suggests that "academic activism" was op-
eratin gattwo levels: among editors and authors.
The "respectability" of The Lancet made a dif-
ference in how these alarming numbers were
consumed. A spokesman for Tory Blair argued
that the study appeared to be based on an
extrapolation technique rather than a detailed
body coung the mainstream British press noted
that the countwas cautious: "While doubts have
been cast over some of the report's findings. . . .
If anything, researchers appear to have erred on
the side of caution, opting to omit all data from
Fallujah, where the mortality rates were signifi-
cantly higher" (Lister 200+). British Foreign
Secretary Jack Straw said on BBC radio, "This
is a very high estimate, indeed. Because it's Tlte
Lance4 it is obviously somethingwe have to look
atin averyserious way" (Straw 2004).The Lancet
produces knowledge of a different valence. By
the end of October 2A04, civilian death toll
estimates included the following: 14,000 to
16,000 (IBC 2006);10,000 to27,000 (Brookings
Instinrtion, a Washington-based think tank);
10,000 (th. I-f.K. foreign secretary; Straw 2004);
37,000 (People's Kifah); 100,000 (The Lancet).
Throughout 2005, new monthly death toll
records were set. By 
-id-June more than 1,000Iraqis had been killed in the previous two
months by 160 suicide bombers. J,rly 2005 was
the bloodiest month in Baghdad's modern his-
tory accordirg to mortuary statistics kept by the
city (Fisk 2005). During a single weekend, 15-
18 July, at least fifteen suicide bombers killed
156 people, mostly civilians. During the weekof
l8-24J.rly, 7 4 civrlians were killed, considerably
more than were killed in the London Under-
ground bombings that same month, though less
than the number of Indian commuters killed by
bombings in Mumbai in July 2006. By July
2006, civilian deaths in Iraq ranged from 39,07 0
to 43,520 accordirg to the IBC. These fataliry
metrics provide disparate grids of civilian
deaths, but the political and social meaning of
these lost lives is effaced by the numbers. Com-
parative counting misses the point.
I argue then for a more relational accountirg
that draws on feminist practice, one that pro-
tests the silent, nameless death counts in Iraq
andthe United States. On 15 October 200 5,The
New York Tirnes (2005) reported that I,929 U.S.
soldiers had been killed in Iraq, confirming the
death of Cpl. John Stalvey the d^y before. This(regular) report was interesting precisely be-
cause of the newspaper's front page story: that
most of the Louisi ana victims of Flurricane
Katrina had yet to be named weeks after the
disaster occurred. "The lack of information
has robbed the death toll . . . of a human
face" (Dewan 2005, A20). [I.S. Government
interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, or lack
thereof in the case of New Orleans, represent
different missions, objectives, and disasters, but
a chain of equivalence can be forged in terms of
accountirg for death: just as the mostly poor,
people of color killed by Hurricane Katrina de-
serve to be named and remembered, so too do
those in Iraq and Afghanistan, whether they are
soldiers or civilians. Fatality metrics efface
fataliq meanings.
When President Bush stood in front of a
banner proclaiming "mission accomplished" in
M^y2003 only 7 percentof the 5 October 2005
number had been killed. In 1993, it took the
death of just eighteen U.S. Rangers in Somalia
during an intense gunfight to precipitate the
withdrawal of LJ.S. peacekeepers from that
multilateral humanitarian mission; hasten the
signing of Presidential Directive No .25 stating
that the United States will not send troops over-
seas to locations that do not present a direct
threat to its national secunV; and prevent Lf.S.
intervention in Rwanda in 1 gg+during the geno-
cide that led to death for almost one million.
The multiple sites hosting meticulous re-
cords, biographies, photos, and circumstances
of death for U.S. and coalition soldiers arenot of
central concern to my argument, except to note
their authors' assiduous efforts to include all
possible details and stories ofindividuals killed.T
Geopolitically, the question ofwho is counted is
related to the questions of "who counts?" and
"who cares?" The fatality metrics of body
counts is clearly lopsided in the context of Iraq:
victimhood is commodified and patriotism pub-
Iicized for soldiers making "the ultimate sacri-
fice," while Iraqi deaths are framed as "the price
that must be paid" for introducing "freedom
and justice."
The Metric Matters More Than the
Madness
How n any times must a rnan look ap
Before he can see the sky?
Yes, 'n' how n any ears must nne rnan baae
Before be can hear people uy?
Yes, 'n' how ntany deatbs will it take till he knows
Tbat too many people haae died?
Tbe anya)e?i my friend, is blowin' in tbe wind,
Tlte anfiDer is bloain' in the wind.
-Bob Dylan, 1963
Benveen anon)zmous body counts and (mostly)
nameless other casualties, connections benveen
here and there, us and them are largely absent
from the media consumed in the Wesr. The re-
ported murder in Iraq ofMargarctFlassan, dir-
ector of the international nongovefirmental aid
agency, CARE, is an important exception. Her
death was a stnry because she was "one of them"
and "one of us." Irish-born with British and
Iraqi citizenrhp, she had lived in Baghdad for
thirty years with her Iraqi-born husband. Ms.
Ffassan came out against the U.S. invasion of
Iraq; she had senred the needs of Iraqis through
her aid work for a dozen years before she was
kidnapped and murdered (th. killing is espe-
cially enigmatic given that both N Qaeda and
many Iraqis had called for her release). Her sto-
ry affected many who watched the war and its
toll, largely because it was told. Most are not.
How can media coverage of violence render its
victims protagonists in the tales told about war?
When violence or disaster strikes, reporters in-
variably seek out the number of fatalities among
their nationals as news of local interest. This is a
parochial strategy perhaps, but one that links
tragedy over there to life over here.
O Tuathail [aka Gerard Toal] (1996) assesses
the journalism ofMaggie O'Kane, an Irish jour-
nalist whose visceral dispatches from the front-
lines of the war in Bosnia 
-Herzegovina
represent a kind of feminist geopolitics at work.
O'Kane's journalism is politically and person-
^!y engaged in its representation of conflict. fuO Tuathail writes, her work offers a "*^y of
seeing that disnrrbs the enframirg of Bosnia in
Western geopolitical discourse as a place be-
yond our universe of moral responsi6ifity" (O
Tuathail 1996, 17 I). "I propose the notion of an
'anti-geopolitical eye' not as a distinct alterna-
tive way of seeirg Bosnia that transcends the
geopolitical . . . [but] an eye that . . . persistently
transgresses, unravels and exceeds the frame-
works of scripting Bosnia in Western geopolit-
ical discourse" (O T"athail 1996, 173).
O frrathail describes O'Kane's work as sup-
pressing a Wbstern voice-of-god geopolitical
script by rendering people, not srates, its prot-
agonists. Like stories of Margaret Flassan's kid-
napping and eventual death, O'Kane's reports
are politic alLy engaging in relation to her audi-
ence with whom she "establishes a moral prox-
imity" (O Tuathail 1996, L7 S).In so doini, she
inserts her reader into the everyd av realities of
people affected byviolent conflict. She attempt-
ed to invoke political change through these sto-
ries and through more obvious political
tactics-such as an open letter to John Majoq
then Prime Minister of Britain-that built on
these narratives of everyday people affectby war
(O T"athail 1996).
Feminist geopolitics in the context of violent
conflict narratives renders civilian people as
embodied political subjects; it forges a space for
the telling of their stories, not just those of
states. In so doing, feminist geopolitics desta-
bilizes dominant and often disembodied geo-
political discourse.
Bridging Us and Them
In the shadow of torfilre in Abu Ghraib prison,
Derek Gregory (2004b, 323) writes that there
"has never been a greater need to untwist the
separations benveen 'us' and 'them' than the
present moment of danger." Nso commenting
on the treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib in
Iraq,Jasbir Puar argues that such violence is not
an exception or an extension of imperialist oc-
cupatioll. "Rather, the focus on purported
homosenral acts obscures other forms of gende-
red violence and serves a broader racist and sex-
ist, as well as homophobic, agen da" (Puar 200+,
523). She too is concerned with the Orientalist
"otherirg" processes that are part and parcel of
the war on and in Iraq. The representation of
deaths, ours and theirs, takes on crucial import-
ance in this volatile context of the war on terror.
Gregory's most recent book, Tbe Colonial Present
(2004a), demonstrates a remarkable shift in
what it means to be critical in one's analysis.
From social theorist to political storyteller,
Gregory's take on the war on terror since 9/II
in Afghanistan and Iraq is, like O'Kane's, en-
gaged, outraged, and visceral. Political geog-
raphy generally and geopolitics specifically
stand to benefit from such anti-Orientalist and
feminist thought. If political geographers are
serious about understanding the nvisted con-
fluence of militarized masculinities, feminini-
ties, sexual identities, and casualties in these
politicized sites of torture and humiliation dur-
irg war, then more rather than less conversation
across the gap benveen feminist and political
geography is needed. Feminist geopolitics, as an
attempt to draw on the strengths of both, rep-
resents one way forward.
Does the threat of terror, rehearsed inces-
sandy by the Bush and Blair adminisrations,
trump effiorts to reduce violence and death
among civilian populations? In Afghrnistan, th.
answer is yes. The death of innocents has been
couched as an unavoidable consequence of the
war on terror. Nthough numbers are incom-
plete, almost as many civilians have died in the
effiort to eliminate the Thliban and establish a
new government as those who died from the
attacks of 9/I1. In Iraq, a war unrelated to Os-
ama bin Laden and N Qaeda (not to menrion
weapons of mass destruction), the same ap-
peared to be true until the death toll of LJ.S.
soldiers began to mount. The repatriation of
soldiers' bodies to the United States is a bar-
ometer of public opinion regarding the war, one
that shows declinirg support for Lf.S. involve-
ment in Iraq and for the president who author-
izedit. The Lf.S. government efforts to hide the
dead bodies of repatriated soldiers were unsuc-
cessful, and this exposure to death has had
devastating consequences for the Bush admin-
istration. By August 2005 most Americans be-
lieved that the war in Iraq was a mistake. Polls
showed that 59 percent did not think the war
was worth the loss of American lives, and 55
percent disliked the wayMr. Bush was handling
it. "Opinions differed by patry-79 percent of
Republicans thought the president was doing
just fine. But this and other polls show a per-
ception offailure that rises with the body count"
(Tbe Economist 2005, 24). By May 2006, U.S.
public support for the war and for Mr. Bush
had plummeted to well below 40 percenr.
During the summer of 2005, Cindy Shee-
han-mother of Casey, a Lf.S. soldier killed in
Iraq in April 200+-began camping outside
President Bush's ranch in Crawford, Texas, to
protest the war. She aftracted a large following
of fellow campers during her time in Crawford,
repeatedly raising the question of why U.S. sol-
diers should be dying in Iraq. Mr. Bush refused
to meet with Ms. Sheehan during her protest,
instead citing the example set by "patriotic,"
pro-warmother and wife, TammyPruett, whose
husband and five sons had all served in Iraq,
though none had been killed. The families of
soldiers killed in Iraq lined up on one side or the
other of this debate, leaving the quesrion of
whether the war in Iraq warranted such deaths
an open one. This fascinatirg deployment
of mothers on the "front" is not new; except
perhaps in North America. Mothers' fronts
have long been used to mobilizepublic opinion,
lobby govemments, and incite the withdrawal
of troops from combat zones of political con-
tention (Enloe 1993; Flyndman and de Alwis
2003). Mothers stand in for their dead sons, os-
tensibly speaking fnr these bodies as people
whose lives are not taken seriously by the state
that deploys or destroys them.
Concluding Words on Concluding War
In both Iraq and Afghanistan our deaths appear
to matter much more than their deaths.s The
stakes are representational and political. "The
world's most powerful military today is led by t
cabal of restless nationalists immersed in an
anti-intellecnral culnrre of affectand ?ggressive
militarism" (O T"athail 2003, 857). O Tuathail
oudines William Connelly's argument that
human thought is not merely representational
but also "enactiver" that it is made possible by a
level constinrted through encounters and nego-
tiations with the world: "The affective tsunami
unleashed by the terrorist attacks of 2001 is a
broad and deep one thathas set down a pgwerful
somatic marker for most Americans" (O Tuat-
hail 2003, 859). Another tsunami of dead U.S.
soldiers appears to be enacting greater wariness
of the war in Iraq, awar Americans now believe
has little to do with the attacks of 9/lI.
When our losses are mourned and broadcast,
the deaths are more fully registered and the
violence of the war questioned. These named
bodies in the contexCof Iraq are generally not
civilians but soldiers. Californian Maria Ru-
zicl<a (2005), in her last dispatch from Iraq,
wrote that
Recendy, I obtained statistics on civilian casual-
ties from a high-ranking U.S. military officer.
. . . A good place to search for Iraqi civilian death
counts is the Iraqi fusistance Center in Baghdad
and the General Information Centers set up by
the U.S. military across lraq. Iraqis who have
been harmed by Americans have the right to file
claims for compensation at these locations.
These statistics demonstrate that the U.S. mili-
tary does track civilian casualties.
Ruzicka was a tireless activist who helped push
the bill for the US$ 17 .5 million compensation
package through the U.S. Congress for Afghan
and Iraqi victims of the war (MacKinnon 2005).
She and her driver were killed in April 2005,
driving to Baghdad airport. Did her body counts
have an impact on the war itselfr Certainly she
paid a high price for her convictions, though she
lived long enough to see some compensation for
the families of civilians killed in Afghanistan and
Iraq. Her efforts to narratethe stories offamilies
as embodied political subjects, even victims, es-
tablished the "moral proximity" O'Kane pro-
duced, and moved the United States to "do
something." Ruzicka's effiorts were an expres-
sion of feminist geopolitics to the extent that
th.y destabilized dominant geopolitical dis-
course by peopling it and by mobilizing the
United States that invaded Iraq in the name of
national security to provide some material se-
curityfor the injured civilians and the families of
those killed in thatvery invasion. Like Margaret
Flassan, who was both like us and like them, and
Maggie O'Kane who rendered "their" pain
and sufFering onr own during anotherwar, Maria
Ruzicka attempted to invoke proximity and
familiarity. She did so by documenting the sto-
ries and losses of those affected by the war in Iraq
to lobby the U.S. government and inform the
North American public. Criti cal race commen-
tators such as Stuart Hall remind us that "con-
crete political engagement does not translate
into an anti-theoretical stance," but rather
widens the notion of what constinrtes theory.
If you ask me what is the object of my work, the
object of the work is to always reproduce the
concrete in thought-not to generate another
good theory but to give a better-theori zed ac-
count ofconcrete historical reality. This is not an
anti-theoretical stance. I need theory in order to
do this. But the goal is to undersand the situ-
ation you started out with better than before.
-(Stoart Hall, quoted in Nagar 2002, 184)
Part of this project to bridge feminist and pol-
itical geography, then, is to challenge the con-
cepts, tools, and theories of political geography
in ways that "demo cratrze knowledge produc-
tion through recognition of the importance of
situated knowledge and through critical en-
gagement benveen scholarship and the world in
which we live and work" (Staeheli and Kofrnan
2004, 5). Feminist geopolitics challenges state-
centric dominant geopolitical narratives that
reduce dead bodies to fatality metrics by estab-
lishing moral proximity benveen those killed
and those watching, and grounding disembod-
ied epistemologies in the suffering and sunrival
of players in the war, making them political
subjects alongside states and armies.
This article has revisited the strategic femi-
nist geopolitics and nonnative liberal political
position invoked in my earlier work on the war
in Afghanistan in light of the war in Iraq. In the
earlier piece, I discuss Michael Shapiro's (1997)
distinction benveen strategic and ethnographic
perspectives of mapping culnrres of war. Stra-
tegic perspectives deepen identity attachments
and formal boundaries by treatitg them as real,
whereas ethnographic approaches aim to un-
settle such taken-for-granted attachments by
questioning the boundary-making narratives
through which th.y are shaped. In tqnng to in-
voke political change accorditg to the logic of
its makers rather than critically engaging the
terms of its struggle, I took a calculated risk that
the former would be politically more effective
than the latter.
From strategic to ethnographic, my position
has shifted. This article illustrates that em-
bodied epistemologies provide alternative ways
to frame war. The question of who is counted
and who counts as subjects in this landscape of
political violence points to a feminist geopoli-
tics that may be more successful at disruptitg
the dominant geopolitical script of the war on
terror in Iraq and elsewhere. Feminist geopol-
itics builds on the strengths of critical geo-
politics, and in so doing recasts political possi-
bilities by identiffrg fissures in dominant
geopolitical scripts. But it goes further: it re-
suscitates the narratives of those affected by
violent conflict, and recasts the subject of geo-
politics as the fate of people, not simply as a
struggle benveen states over oil and weapons of
mass destruction. In very different ways
Margaret Flassan and Maria Ruzicka embodied
hope and prospects for change in Iraq. They
defied simplistic binaries of us and them,
here and there, but they also paid for such
struggles with their lives. Their work destabil-
izes dominant geopolitical scripts and generates
more epistemologically embodied ways of
seeing. I
Notes
t By liberal, I refer to the model of rights derived from
seventeenth-century political thought that focuses
on the rights accorded to individuals as well as the
obligations individuals owe society and the state
(Kofrnan 2003). Critics of liberalism question the
scale at which rights are borne (i.e., that of the in-
dividual), and highlight group or communal rights
(Isin and Wood 1999) or deconstruct political com-
munity as pre-given (Mouffe 1992).
2 A more explicidy feminist geopolitical analysis of the
torture, humiliation, and feminization of male pris-
oners of war by U.S. soldiers and private contractors
in Abu Ghraib prison remains to be done ( for a start,
see Gregory 2004b).
3 This line of argument might be refuted by question-
irg the authority to employ violence: Hussein mer-
cilessly killed many Iraqis through his state
apparatus, but the United States illegally (under in-
ternational law) invaded another country and is per-
forming the same unacceptable, fatal behavior
without the authority of the state behind it.
a Interestingly, the project is an extension of a similar
effort in Afghanistan, led by Professor Marc Herold
who has produced the most comprehensive record of
civilian deaths in the war there from October 2001 to
the present. The Iraq Body Count is a nonprofit or-
ganization and database, available at hnp:/ /
www.iraqbodycount.orgl Qast accessed October
2006).
s The Iraq Body Count project aims to promote public
undersanding, engagement, and support for the
human dimension in wars by providing a reliable and
up-to-date documentation of civilian casualties in
the event of a U.S.-led war in 2003 in the country.
The dnty of recorder falls particulttly heavily on the
ordinary ciazens of those states whose militaryforces
cause the deaths. In the current crisis, this respon-
sibility must be borne predominandy by citizens of
the United States and the United Kingdom.
6 The methods used to approximate this death toll are
based on public health research techniques in devel-
oping counries where census data are often unavail-
able. Dr. Les Roberts of John Hopkins University
and his colleagues (2004) employed a clustering
technique whereby thirty-three neighborhoods were
rand omly s elected, then the thirty hous eholds cl os est
to 
^ 
selected point were interviewed. Flouseholds
were asked about births and deaths that had occurred
since 1 January 2002. Their deductions about the
number of deaths caused by the war were then made
by comparing the aggregate death rates before and
after 18 March 2003. A large range of deaths is of-
fered, from 8,000 to 194,000, but the central and
most likely value is 98,000. Not all of these deaths
are attributable directly to the violence in Iraq, but
roughly 60 percent is said to be the result of the
violence. Fallujah was originally selected as one of
the clusters, but due to disproportionate fighting and
death in that city, the researchers omitted it from
their analysis. This study is noteworthy for the
unusual scrutiny of academic methods employed.
7 See hwp:l/icasualties.orgloif/ for Iraq Coalition
Casualty Count, but also http://www.centcom.miV
for the US Central Command site and http://www.
cnn. com/ S PECIAL S / 2 003 / k aq/ forc es/ca sual ti es/
index.html for CNN's coverage. The Iraq Coali-
tion Casualty Count maintains that its site is
superior to that of the U. S. Central Command in
Thmpa , Florida, as well as CI{N's site with photos.
Few of these sites are straightforward in their pol-
itical message. Some are outraged at the deaths,
others are informational, yet others are clearly anti-
war. On 20 November 200+, the number of U.S.
military deaths recorded was | ,221 , as counted by the
Iraq Coalition Casuality Count, .4rith several more
deaths among other nationalities.
8I refer here to the deaths of U.S. and British soldiers
in Iraq.
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